The writer chairs the Social Mobility Commission and is principal and CEO, Blackpool and The Fylde College
本文作者是英国社会流动委员会(Social Mobility Commission)主席，布莱克浦和法尔德学院(Blackpool and The Fylde College)校长兼行政总裁
I witnessed the Tottenham riot in 1985, lived in Salford during the riots in 1992 and went to lead a school desegregation project in Oldham after the unrest in 2001. I saw the 2011 riots unfold in Manchester and now, in 2024, work in Blackpool — one of the areas involved in recent disturbances.
我曾目睹1985年的托特纳姆(Tottenham)骚乱，在1992年骚乱期间住在索尔福德(Salford)，并在2001年骚乱后前往奥尔德姆(Oldham)领导一个学校废除种族隔离项目。我目睹了2011年的曼彻斯特骚乱，如今，2024年，我在近期发生骚乱的地区之一布莱克浦(Blackpool)工作。
We should not oversimplify, but there seems to have been a shift over this period from urban unrest linked to race and equal opportunity, mainly in big cities, to social friction linked to immigration in towns and seaside resorts. This points to a new geography of disadvantage, something the Social Mobility Commission has been collating evidence on for some time. The Levelling Up white paper of 2022 was the first formal exploration of this new landscape. It recognised how interconnected factors shape the decline of places and how difficult it is to reverse the downward spiral. But it was weak on two important issues.
我们不应该过分简单化，但在此期间似乎发生了一个转变：从与种族和平等机会相关的城市骚乱（主要发生在大城市），转变为在城镇和海滨度假胜地发生的与移民相关的社会摩擦。这表明了一个新的劣势格局，社会流动委员会收集相关证据已有一段时间。2022年的《城镇升级白皮书》(Levelling Up white paper)是对这一新格局的首次正式探索。它认识到相互关联的因素如何影响地方的衰落，以及扭转这种螺旋式下降趋势有多么困难。但它在两个重要问题上比较薄弱。
First, the clustering of disadvantage in the poorest places. Private sector investment has dried up, large employers have closed, traditional jobs have gone and there is little to fill the vacuum. Our higher education system provides a route for “moving out to move up” for the most academically able but, beyond this, places and their communities have been left almost entirely dependent on welfare, public services and the “everyday” economy.
首先，劣势集中在最贫穷的地方。私营部门的投资已经枯竭，大型雇主已经关闭，传统工作岗位已经消失，却没有什么可以填补空白。英国的高等教育体系为最有学术能力的人提供了一条“离开然后向上攀登”的途径，但除此之外，地方及其社区几乎完全依赖于福利、公共服务和“日常”经济。
Less familiar is how the invisible hand of disorganised public policy has exacerbated this process. Examples include the expansion of private renting funded via housing benefit, private children’s homes and accommodation for asylum seekers and refugees. These usually involve substantial payments to private sector partners who add no value and are often substandard. This has not helped attract investment; local leaders must choose between managing disadvantage or growing the economy. Few can do both.
不太为人所知的是，没有条理的公共政策的无形之手如何加剧这一过程。例子包括：由住房补助金资助的私人租房的扩张、私营“儿童之家”（children’s home，寄养制度的一部分——译者注），以及为寻求庇护者和难民提供住房。这些通常涉及向私营部门合作伙伴支付大量款项，而这些合作伙伴并不增加价值，而且往往质量低劣。这无助于吸引投资；地方领导人必须在管理劣势与发展经济之间做出选择。很少有人能同时做到这两点。
This combines with the second issue, which relates to the white British poor. It is important to be specific here — this group is not the same as the white “working class”. As we showed in our State of the Nation report last year, there are important differences in outcomes between the “upper” and “lower” working class. At the bottom is a group that includes adults and young people with low or no qualifications, who are more likely to be in and out of work or dependent on welfare, and the least likely to go to university.
第二个问题与英国白人穷人有关。这里需要明确一点——这个群体不同于白人“工人阶级”。就像我们在去年的《国情报告》(State of the Nation)中指出的，“上层”和“下层”工人阶级在人生结局上存在重大差异。底层是一个包括低学历或没有学历的成年人和年轻人的群体，他们更有可能工作不稳定，或依赖福利，而且最不可能上大学。
Anyone who has lived or worked in poor communities knows they are complex. Some individuals will be there temporarily, others are stuck. The chances of moving out could be better but are not dismal: 11 per cent of higher professionals and 21 per cent of lower professionals start life in the lower working-class group. And 70 per cent of the lower working-class group will be upwardly mobile to some degree.
在贫困社区生活或工作过的任何人都知道，这些社区很复杂。有些人只会暂时在那里，另一些人则会一直呆着。离开的机会虽有改进余地，但并不太糟糕：11%的高级专业人士和21%的初级专业人士来自下层工人阶级家庭。70%的下层工人阶级群体在一定程度上向上流动。
But who are the most likely to prosper? In terms of long range, absolute upward mobility — those whose parents come from the lowest occupational group being employed in the highest occupational group — individuals from Chinese and Indian backgrounds come first and second. The white British as a whole come in the middle, but on key educational attainment indicators, disadvantaged white Britons come near the bottom. Relative mobility, measuring the strength of the link between parental and child occupations, is more fluid among ethnic minorities and more rigid among the white British. The prospects of upward educational and occupational mobility are strongest in London.
但哪些人最有可能成功？就长期、绝对的向上流动性而言——本人属于最高职业群体、而父母属于最低职业群体的人——华裔和印度裔人群分别排在第一和第二位。英国白人作为一个整体处于中间位置，但在关键的教育程度指标上，处于弱势地位的英国白人接近垫底。就相对流动性（衡量父母与子女职业之间联系的强度）而言，少数族裔的流动性更大，而英国白人群体更为僵硬。伦敦的教育和职业向上流动前景最强。
Solutions are either in short supply or ineffective. Policies tend to lose focus on the most disadvantaged or propose one-dimensional answers. Lifting the two-child benefit cap, for example, may be a good policy for alleviating poverty in larger families. But to improve their opportunities requires a more rounded approach to individuals.
解决方案要么供不应求，要么无效。政策倾向于要么失去对最弱势群体的关注，要么提出一维的答案。例如，取消二孩福利上限也许是减轻较大家庭贫困的好政策。但如果要改善孩子们的机会，就需要以更加全方位的方式支持个人。
Demands to “Bring back Sure Start” overlook its limitations. A recent Institute for Fiscal Studies analysis established a link between access to these early years centres and improved GCSE grades. This is encouraging, but it was only significant for non-white children. “Make schools more responsive to the under-resourced” is another simplistic solution — ignoring the fact that some poor children do well academically, especially ethnic minorities. What are they doing differently? What exactly is happening in the communities and families that always come last?
“恢复Sure Start早教中心”的要求，忽视了它的局限性。英国财政研究所(Institute for Fiscal Studies)最近发表的一份分析报告，确立了进入这类早教中心与提高普通中等教育证书(GCSE)成绩之间的联系。这令人鼓舞，但只对非白人儿童才有显著影响。“让学校更好地响应资源不足的群体”是另一个简单化的解决方案，因为它忽略了一个事实：有些贫困儿童，尤其是少数族裔家庭的孩子们，在学业上表现良好。他们在什么地方做得不同？那些总是垫底的社区和家庭到底发生了什么？
There is no single policy or intervention to turn this problem around. We argue that the starting point for improving opportunities must be a growing, innovative economy, addressing regional disparities. But this must connect with wider place-based approaches, focused on communities and families, and a genuine willingness to understand what holds the white poor back.
没有一项单一的政策或干预措施可以扭转这一问题。我们认为，改善机会的起点必须是营造一个不断增长的创新经济，解决地区差异。但这必须与整体的地方政策相配合，聚焦于社区和家庭，并真正愿意理解是什么在阻碍白人穷人的人生道路。